Mon idée fondamentale est que l’on ne voit pas pourquoi une représentation au sort serait pire qu’une représentation dans les conditions actuelles.
Mon idée fondamentale est que l’on ne voit pas pourquoi une représentation au sort serait pire qu’une représentation dans les conditions actuelles. Déjà, la représentation au sort élimine les gens qui veulent gouverner. Deuxièmement, elle élimine le clientélisme. Troisièmement, elle élimine le développement des sentiments troubles qui sont liés au rapport électoral lui-même. Évidemment, on peut toujours dire : « Je ne vois pas ma famille, mon concierge ou mon plombier diriger l’État. » On peut. Mais pourquoi voit-on particulièrement, pour cette tâche, des membres d’une école d’Administration ou des avocats d’affaire ? L’État doit-il être dirigé par des représentants d’intérêts particuliers bien déterminés ? Par des malades du pouvoir ? Car c’est bien la combinaison que l’on a actuellement : l’État est gouverné par des drogués du pouvoir et des représentants des intérêts financiers.
Electing the Doge of Venice: analysis of a 13th Century protocol♦ Miranda Mowbray, Dieter Gollmann1 Enterprise Systems and Storage Laboratory HP Laboratories Bristol HPL-2007-28(R.1) July 12, 2007* voting theory, leader election, Venice This paper discusses the protocol used for electing the Doge of Venice between 1268 and the end of the Republic in 1797. We will show that it has some useful properties that in addition to being interesting in themselves, also suggest that its fundamental design principle is worth investigating for application to leader election protocols in computer science. For example it gives some opportunities to minorities while ensuring that more popular candidates are more likely to win, and offers some resistance to corruption of voters. The most obvious feature of this protocol is that it is complicated and would have taken a long time to carry out. We will advance a hypothesis as to why it is so complicated, and describe a simplified protocol with very similar features.
ベネチアのドージェの選出：13世紀のプロトコルの分析♦。 Miranda Mowbray, Dieter Gollmann1 Enterprise Systems and Storage Laboratory HP Laboratories Bristol HPL-2007-28(R.1) 2007年7月12日*より 投票理論、リーダー選挙、ベニス 本稿では、1268年から1797年の共和制の終焉までの間、ヴェネツィアのドージェを選出するために使用されたプロトコルについて述べる。このプロトコルにはいくつかの有用な特性があり、それ自体が興味深いだけでなく、その基本的な設計原理が、コンピュータサイエンスにおけるリーダー選挙のプロトコルに適用するために調査する価値があることを示唆するものであることを示す。例えば、より人気のある候補者が勝ちやすいようにしながらも、少数派にある程度の機会を与え、有権者の腐敗にある程度の抵抗力を持たせている。 このプロトコルの最も明白な特徴は、複雑で実行に時間がかかるということである。なぜ複雑なのか、その仮説を立て、よく似た特徴を持つ簡略化されたプロトコルを説明することにする。
Manin, Bernard 1995．Principes du Gouvernement Reprsentatif, [Paris]: Calmann-Levy.
マナンは以下を参照
Hansen, Mogens Herman 1991．The Athenian Democracy in the Age of Demosthenes: structure, principles and ideology, Oxford; Cambridge, Mass.: Basil Blackwell.
1 Direct democracy and representation: selection of officials in Athens
2 The triumph of election
Lot and election in the republican tradition: the lessons of history
The political theory of election and lot in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries
The triumph of election: consenting to power rather than holding office
3 The principle of distinction
England
France
The United States
4 A democratic aristocracy
The aristocratic character of election: a pure theory
The two faces of election: the benefits of ambiguity
Election and the principles of modern natural right
5 The verdict of the people
Partial independence of representatives
Freedom of public opinion
The repeated character of elections
Trial by discussion
6 Metamorphoses of representative government
Parliamentarianism
Party democracy
“Audience" democracy
Conclusion
Index
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our familiar environment would lead us to believe. This book does not aspire to discern the ultimate essence or significance of political representation; it merely sets out to shed light on the un-obvious properties and effects of a set of institutions invented two centuries ago.9 In general, we refer to governments in which those institutions are present as "representative." In the final analysis, though, it is not the term "representation" that is important here. It will simply be a question of analysing the elements and consequences of the combination of arrangements, whatever name we give it. Four principles have invariably been observed in representative regimes, ever since this form of government was invented: Those who govern are appointed by election at regular intervals. The decision-making of those who govern retains a degree of independence from the wishes of the electorate. Those who are governed may give expression to their opinions and political wishes without these being subject to the control of those who govern. Public decisions undergo the trial of debate. The central institution of representative government is election, and a large part of this book will be devoted to it. We shall also be analysing the principles that shape the policies pursued by those who govern and the content of public decisions. A final chapter will look at the different forms assumed by the principles of representative government from the time of its invention to the present day. 1 Madison, "Federalist 10," in A. Hamilton, J. Madison, and J. Jay, The Federalist Papers [1787], ed. C. Rossiter (New York: Penguin, 1961), p. 81. 2 Madison, "Federalist 63," in The Federalist Papers, p. 387; Madison's emphasis. 3 Madison, "Federalist 10," in The Federalist Papers, p. 82. Note the dual meaning of the phrase "a chosen body of citizens." The representatives form a chosen body in the sense that they are elected but also in the sense that they are distinguished and eminent individuals. 4 Ibid. 5 Dire de l'Abbé Siéyès sur la question du veto royal [7 September 1789] (Versailles: Baudoin, Imprimeur de l' Assemblée Nationale, 1789) p. 12; see also Siéyès, Quelques idées de constitution applicables à la ville de Paris [July 1789] (Versailles: Baudoin, Imprimeur de l' Assemblée Nationale, 1789), pp. 3–4. 6 Siéyès, Observations sur le rapport du comité de constitution concernant la nouvelle organisation de la France [October 1789] (Versailles: Baudoin, Imprimeur de l' Assemblée Nationale, 1789) p. 35. On the link between the advocacy of representation and that of division of labor and modern "commercial society," see Pasquale Pasquino, "Emmanuel Siéyès, Benjamin Constant et le 'Gouvernement des Modernes'," in Revue Française de Science Politique, Vol. 37, 2, April 1987, pp. 214–28. 7A detailed and penetrating analysis of this change and in particular of its symbolic significance in France is given in Pierre Rosanvallon, Le sacre du citoyen. Histoire du suffrage universel en France (Paris: Gallimard, 1992). 8 On this point, see Pierre Rosanvallon, "L'histoire du mot démocratie à l'époque moderne," and John Dunn, "Démocratie: l'état des lieux," in La Pensée politique, Situations de la démocratie (Paris: Seuil-Gallimard, 1993). 9 In this the present work differs from two books that particularly stand out among the many studies of representation: G. Leibholz, Das Wesen der Repräsentation [1929] (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1966) and H. Pitkin, The Concept of Representation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967).
1 マディソン、"Federalist 10," in A. Hamilton, J. Madison, and J. Jay, The Federalist Papers [1787], ed. C. Rossiter (New York:) C. Rossiter (New York: Penguin, 1961), p. 81. 2 マディソン，"Federalist 63," in The Federalist Papers, p. 387; マディソンが強調している。3 マディソン、「フェデラリスト10」、『フェデラリスト・ペーパーズ』、82頁。"a chosen body of citizens" というフレーズの二重の意味に注意してほしい。代表者たちは、選挙で選ばれたという意味で選ばれた団体を形成しているが、著名で高名な個人であるという意味でも選ばれた団体を形成しているのである。4 同上。5 Dire de l'Abé Siéyès sur la question du veto royal [7 September 1789] (Versailles: Baudoin, Imprimeur de l' Assemblée Nationale, 1789) p.12; Siéyès, Quelques idées de constitution applicables à la ville de Paris [7月 1789] (Versailles: Baudoin, Imprimeur de l' Assemblée Nationale, 1789), pp.3-4も参照。6 Siéyès, Observations sur le rapport du comité de constitution concernant la nouvelle organ de la France [October 1789] (Versailles: Baudoin, Imprimeur de l' Assemblée Nationale, 1789) p. 35. 代表制の提唱と分業制および近代「商業社会」の提唱との関連については、パスカル・パスキーノ「Emmanuel Siéyès, Benjamin Constant et le 'Gouvernement des Modernes'," Revue Française de Science Politique, Vol.37, 2, April 1987, pp.214-28を参照のこと。7この変化と、特にフランスにおけるその象徴的な意味についての詳細で鋭い分析は、Pierre Rosanvallon, Le sacre du citoyen. Histoire du suffrage universel en France (Paris: Gallimard, 1992). 8 この点については、Pierre Rosanvallon, "L'histoire du mot démocratie à l'époque moderne" and John Dunn, "Démocratie: l'état des lieux," in La Pensée politique, Situations de la démocratie (Paris: Seuil-Galimard, 1993) を参照。9 この点で、本研究は、表象に関する数多くの研究の中でも特に目を引く2冊の本とは異なる。G. Leibholz, Das Wesen der Repräsentation [1929] (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1966) and H. Pitkin, The Concept of Representation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967).
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1 Direct democracy and representation: selection of officials in Athens Representative government gives no institutional role to the assembled people. That is what most obviously distinguishes it from the democracy of the ancient city-states. However, an analysis of the Athenian regime, the best-known example of classical democracy, shows that a further feature (one less often commented on) also separates representative democracy from so-called direct democracy. In the Athenian democracy, many important powers were not in the hands of the assembled people. Certain functions were performed by elected magistrates. But what is particularly remarkable is that most of the tasks not done by the Assembly were entrusted to citizens selected by a drawing of lots. By contrast, none of the representative governments set up in the last two centuries has ever used lot to assign even one modicum of political power, whether sovereign or executive, central or local. Representation has only been associated with the system of election, sometimes in combination with heredity (as in constitutional monarchies), but never with lot. So consistent and universal a phenomenon ought to invite attention and indeed scrutiny. It cannot be accounted for, as can the absence of the popular assembly, by material constraints alone. To explain why representative governments grant no role to the assembly of citizens, authors usually talk about the size of modern states. It is simply not possible, in political entities so much larger and more populous than the citystates of Antiquity, to bring all the citizens together in one place to deliberate and make decisions as a body. Inevitably, therefore, the function of government is performed by a number of individuals smaller than the totality of citizens. As we have seen, the practical impossibility of gathering the whole people together was not the prime consideration motivating such founders of representative institutions as Madison or Siéyès. The fact remains that the sheer size of modern states had the effect of making it materially impracticable for the assembled people to play a part in government. Moreover, this is likely to have counted for something in the establishment of purely representative systems. On the other hand, it cannot have been the size of modern states that prompted the rejection of the lot system. Even in large, densely populated states it is technically feasible to use lot to select a small number of individuals from a bigger body. Whatever the size of that body, lot will always make it possible to extract therefrom as small a group of individuals as is required. As a method of selection, it is not impracticable; in fact, the judicial system still makes regular use of it today in constituting juries. So this exclusive recourse to election rather than lot cannot stem from purely practical constraints. The political use of lot is virtually never thought about today.1 For a long time lot has had no place in the political culture of modern societies, and today we tend to regard it as a somewhat bizarre custom. We know, of course, that it was used in ancient Athens, and this fact is occasionally remarked upon, though chiefly in tones of amazement. In fact, that the Athenians could have adopted such a procedure seems to be the major puzzle. However, we may benefit from an inversion of the usual point of view whereby the culture of the present constitutes the center of the world. It might be better to ask: “Why do not we practice lot, and nonetheless call ourselves democrats?” It might, of course, be objected that there is not a great deal to be learned from such a question and that the answer is obvious. Lot, it can be argued, selects anyone, no matter whom, including those with no particular aptitude for governing. It is therefore a manifestly defective method of selection, and its disappearance requires no further explanation. This is an argument, however, in which the obviousness of the premise ought to cast doubt on the soundness of the conclusion. The Athenians, not generally regarded as unsophisticated in political matters, must have been aware that lot appointed people indiscriminately, yet they continued to use the system for two hundred years. The fact that selection by lot risks elevating unqualified citizens to public office is not a modern discovery. Incompetence in office was as much a danger in Athens as it is in present-day polities. Moreover, if Xenophon is to be believed, Socrates himself ridiculed the appointment of magistrates by lot on the grounds that no one chose ships’ pilots, architects, or fluteplayers by this method.2 That means, however, that the question we should be asking is whether the Athenian democrats really did have no answer when faced with this objection. Possibly they saw
advantages in lot that, all things considered, they felt outweighed this major disadvantage. Possibly, too, they had found a way of guarding against the risk of incompetence through supplementary institutional arrangements. Concerning lot, it is by no means clear that the danger of incompetence is the last word. We cannot pronounce this selection method defective and destined to disappear before we have carefully analysed how it was used in Athens and how democrats justified it. In any case, whatever the reason lot disappeared, the crucial fact remains that Athenian democracy employed it to fill certain posts, whereas representative regimes give it no place whatsoever. The difference can hardly be without consequence on the exercise of power, the way it is distributed, and the characteristics of those who govern. The problem is identifying the consequences with any precision. So if we wish to throw light on one of the major differences between representative government and “direct” democracy, we need to compare the effects of election with those of lot. Analyses of representative government typically contrast election with heredity. In part, such a viewpoint is justified: elected governments directly replaced hereditary governments, and there is no doubt that, in making election the chief basis of political legitimacy, the founders of our modern representative republics were above all rejecting the hereditary principle. Modern representative systems are certainly characterized by the fact that in them power is not inherited (not in essence, anyway). But what also distinguishes them, even if it receives less attention, is the complete absence of the use of lot in the assignment of political functions exercised by a restricted number of citizens. The contrast between election and lot might reveal an aspect of representative government that remains hidden so long as the hereditary system constitutes the sole point of contrast. A study of the use of lot in Athens is in order, not only because lot is one of the distinguishing features of “direct” democracy, but also because the Athenians employed it side by side with election, which makes their institutions particularly well suited for a comparison of the two methods. Moreover, the recent publication of a superb study of Athenian democracy, remarkable in both its breadth and precision, has thrown fresh light on these points.3 The Athenian democracy entrusted to citizens drawn by lot most of the functions not performed by the Popular Assembly (ekklēsia).4 This principle applied mainly to the magistracies (archai). Of the approximately 700 magistrate posts that made up the Athenian administration, some 600 were filled by lot.5 The magistracies assigned by lot (klēros) were usually collégial.6 The term of office was one year. A citizen was not permitted to hold a given magistracy more than once, and while he might be appointed to a number of different magistracies during his lifetime, the timetable for rendering account (no one might accede to a fresh post before having rendered account for the previous one) meant that a person could not in practice serve as a magistrate two consecutive years. All citizens thirty years of age or older (about 20,000 persons in the fourth century) who were not under penalty of atimia (deprivation of civil rights) might accede to these magistracies.7 Those whose names had been drawn by lot had to undergo examination (dokimasia) before they could take up office. This test examined whether they were legally qualified to be magistrates; it also checked whether their conduct towards their parents had been satisfactory and whether they had paid their taxes and had performed their military service. The test had a political side to it, too: an individual known for his oligarchical sympathies might be rejected. In no way, however, did dokimasia seek to weed out incompetents, and usually it was a mere formality.8 Nevertheless, the Athenian system did offer certain safeguards against magistrates whom the people decided were bad or incompetent. In the first place, magistrates were subject to constant monitoring by the Assembly and the courts. Not only did they have to render account (euthynai) on leaving office, but during their term of office any citizen could at any time lay a charge against them and demand their suspension. At Principal Assemblies (ekklēsiai kyriai) voting on the magistrates was a compulsory agenda item. Any citizen might then propose a vote of no confidence against a magistrate (whether appointed by lot or by election). If the magistrate lost the vote, he was immediately suspended and his case was referred to the courts, which then had the responsibility of either acquitting him (whereupon he would resume his functions) or condemning him.9
Since these arrangements were common knowledge, every citizen was aware in advance that, if he were to become a magistrate, he would have to render account, face the constant possibility of impeachment, and undergo punishment if the case went against him. But – and this deserves particular attention – only the names of those who wished to be considered were inserted into the lottery machines, the klēroteria. Lots were drawn not among all citizens thirty and over, but only among those who had offered themselves as candidates.10 In other words, when the selection of magistrates by lot is placed in its institutional context it looks far less rudimentary than is commonly supposed today. The combination of the voluntary nature of such service and this advance knowledge of the risks incurred must in fact have led to self-selection among potential magistrates. Those who did not feel up to filling a post successfully could easily avoid being selected; indeed, they had strong incentives to do so. The whole arrangement thus had the effect of giving every citizen who deemed himself fit for office an opportunity of acceding to the magistracies. Anyone taking up that opportunity exposed himself to the virtually constant judgment of others, but that judgment took effect only a posteriori – after the candidate had begun to act in office. Chance apart, access to office was determined only by the assessment each candidate made of himself and his own abilities. In the case of elective magistracies, on the other hand, it was the judgment of others that opened the way to public office. It follows that such judgment was exercised not only a posteriori, as in the case of magistracies assigned by lot, but also a priori that is, before the candidates had had a chance to prove themselves (at least for candidates who had not held office previously).
Like magistracies assigned by lot, elective offices were also constantly monitored by the Assembly. Any citizen aged thirty or over might stand for an elective post. However, there were several differences between elective magistracies and those assigned by lot. In the first place, while the elective offices were annual, like the others, a person might be re-elected to the same office several times in succession; there were no term limits. In the fifth century, Pericles was re-elected general (stratēgos) for more than twenty years. The most famous of fourth-century generals, Phocion, held office for forty-five years. Moreover, the Athenians reserved appointment by election for magistracies for which competence was judged vital. These included the generals and top military administrators from the fifth century onwards and the chief financial officials created or reformed in the fourth century (particularly the Treasurer of the Military Fund, the administrators of the Theoric Fund, and the Financial Comptroller).11 The elective posts were also the most important ones: the conduct of war and the management of finance affected what happened to the city more than any other function. (Athens in fact spent most of the fifth century at war; periods of peace were the exception.) Lastly, it was in the elective offices, rather than among the magistracies filled by lot, that persons of eminence would be found. In the fifth century, the most influential politicians were elected as generals (Themistocles, Aristides, Cimon, Pericles). The practice was to speak of orators and generals (rhētores kai stratēgoi) in the same breath. Although orators were not public officials, it was they who carried most weight in the Assembly. The bracketing together of orators and generals thus suggests that in certain respects they were seen as belonging to the same group, what might today be termed “political leaders.” In the fourth century, the link between orators and generals loosened, and orators as a category came to be associated more with the financial magistrates, who were also elected. Also, a social change took place around the time of the Peloponnesian War: whereas the generals and politicians of influence in the fifth century belonged to the old families of the landed aristocracy (Cimon, for instance, came from the famous Lakiad family, while Pericles was related to the Alcmaionid clan), in the fourth century political leaders tended to be recruited from wealthy families of good standing, whose fortunes were of more recent date and derived from slave-manned workshops.12 Throughout the history of the Athenian democracy, there was thus a certain correlation between the exercise of political office and membership in political and social elites. In general, the magistrates (whether elected or selected by lot) did not exercise major political power; they were above all administrators and executives.13 They prepared the agenda for the Assembly (probouleuein), conducted preliminary investigations prior to lawsuits (anakrinein), summoned and presided over courts, and carried out the decisions made by the Assembly and the courts (prostattein, epitattein). But they did not hold what was regarded as decisive power (to kyrion einai): they did not make the crucial political choices. That power belonged to the Assembly and the courts. In this respect, the contrast with modern political representatives is manifest. Moreover, even if in their capacity as chairmen the magistrates drew up the agendas of decision-making bodies, they acted at the request of ordinary citizens and put down for discussion motions that those citizens proposed. The power to make proposals and take initiative was not the privilege of any office but belonged in principle to any citizen wishing to exercise it. The Athenians had a special expression to denote one who took political initiative. A person who submitted a proposal to the Assembly or initiated proceedings before the courts was called tōn Athēnaiōn ho boulomenos hois exestin (any Athenian who wishes from amongst those who may) or ho boulomenos (anyone who wishes) for short. The term could be translated as “the first comer,” though it had no pejorative connotation in the mouths of democrats. Indeed, ho boulomenos was a key figure in the Athenian democracy.14 He could in fact be anyone, at least in principle, but that was precisely what democrats prided themselves on. “You blame me,’ Aeschines replied to one of his opponents, “for not always coming before the people; and you imagine that your hearers will fail to detect that your criticism is based on principles foreign to democracy? In oligarchies, it is not anyone who wishes that may speak but only those who have authority [en men tais oligarchiais ouch ho boulomenos, all’ho dynasteuōn dēmēgorei]; in democracies, anyone who wishes may speak, whenever he wishes [en dēmokratiais ho boulomenos kai otan autō dokei].”15
くじ引きで決められる奉行と同様に、被選挙権も議会が常に監視していた。30歳以上の国民は誰でも選挙に立候補することができた。しかし、被選挙権のある奉行所と抽選権のある奉行所には、いくつかの違いがあった。まず、被選役職は他の役職と同様に年次であるのに対し、同じ役職に何度も再選される可能性があり、任期の制限はなかった。5世紀には、ペリクレスが20年以上にわたって将軍（stratēgos）に再選されました。4世紀の最も有名な将軍であるフォキオンは、45年間も将軍の座にあった。また、アテネ人は、能力が不可欠と判断される職務については、選挙による任命を行っていた。選挙で選ばれるポストは最も重要なポストでもあり、戦争の遂行や財政の管理は、他のどの職務よりも都市の動向に影響を与えるからである11。(アテネは5世紀の大半を戦争に費やし、平和な時期は例外的だった）。最後に、高名な人物が現れるのは、くじ引きで選ばれた行政官ではなく、選挙で選ばれた役職であった。5世紀には、最も影響力のある政治家が将軍に選ばれました（テミストクレス、アリスティデス、シモン、ペリクレス）。弁論家と将軍を同列に語ることが慣行となっていました（rhētores kai stratēgoi）。弁士は公務員ではありませんが、議会で最も重きを置いていたのは彼らでした。このように、雄弁家と将軍が同列に語られているのは、ある意味で同じグループ、つまり今日では「政治指導者」と呼ばれているグループに属していると考えられる。4世紀になると、弁士と将軍の結びつきは弱まり、弁士は選挙で選ばれた財務奉行と結びつくようになる。また、ペロポネソス戦争の頃には、5世紀に影響力を持っていた将軍や政治家が旧来の土地貴族の家系に属していたのに対し（例えば、シモンは有名なラキアド家の出身であり、ペリクレスはアルクマイオニード家の血を引いていた）、4世紀の政治指導者は、最近になって奴隷を使った作業場で得られた財産を持つ裕福な家系から採用される傾向にあった12。このように、アテネの民主主義の歴史を通じて、政治的役職の行使と政治的・社会的エリートの一員との間には一定の相関関係があった。一般に、司祭（選挙で選ばれたものであれ、くじで選ばれたものであれ）は大きな政治的権力を行使することはなく、何よりも行政官、管理者であった13。彼らは、議会の議題を準備し（プロブーリュエイン）、訴訟の前に予備調査を行い（アナクリネイン）、裁判所を召喚・裁判長とし、議会や裁判所の決定を実行する（プロスタッティン、エピタッティン）。しかし、彼らは決定権（to kyrion einai）と呼ばれる権力を持たず、重要な政治的選択をすることはなかった。そのような権力は、議会や裁判所に属していたのである。この点では、現代の政治家との対比が明確である。また、司祭は議長として意思決定機関の議題を作成するにしても、一般市民の要請に応じて行動し、市民が提案した議案を審議に付した。提案力や主導権は役人の特権ではなく、原則として行使したい市民に与えられたものである。アテネでは、政治的イニシアチブをとる人を示す特別な表現があった。議会に議案を提出したり、裁判所に訴訟を起こしたりした者は、「Tōn Athēnaiōn ho boulomenos hois exestin（できる者の中から希望するアテネ人）」または「ho boulomenos（希望する者）」と略して呼ばれた。この言葉は「最初に来た人」と訳すことができるが、民主主義者の口からは何の侮辱的な意味合いもなかった。実際、ホー・ブーロメノスはアテネの民主主義における重要な人物であった14。実際、彼は少なくとも原理的には誰でもよかったのだが、それこそが民主主義者の矜持であった。「アイスキネスは反対派の一人に、「あなたは私を、常に民衆の前に出てこないことを非難しているが、あなたの批判が民主主義とは異なる原理に基づいていることを、あなたの聴衆が見抜けないとでも思っているのか？寡頭制では、発言したい人が誰でも発言できるのではなく、権限を持つ人だけが発言できますが（en men tais oligarchiais ouch ho boulomenos, all'ho dynasteuōn dēmēgorei）、民主制では、発言したい人がいつでも発言できます（en dēmokratiais ho boulomenos kai otan autō dokei）」15
Probably it was only a small minority that dared come forward to address the Assembly, with the vast majority confining themselves to listening and voting.16 In practice, a process of self-selection limited the numbers of those taking initiative. But the principle that anyone wishing to do so was equally able to submit a proposal to his fellow-citizens and, more generally, to address them (isēgoria) constituted one of the highest ideals of democracy.17 At any rate, the magistrates had no monopoly of political initiative, and their power was, generally speaking, strictly limited. Evidently, then, as Hansen observes, there is an element of deliberate ignorance or even sophistry in the remarks that Xenophon attributes to Socrates. In ridiculing the practice of selecting magistrates by lot on the grounds that no one would choose a ship’s pilot, an architect, or a flute-player by that method, Socrates was deliberately missing the crucial point that, in a democracy, magistrates were not supposed to be pilots.18 That is not the end of the matter, however, because the magistracies, in the strict sense, were not the only offices assigned by lot. Most historical studies choose to discuss the implications of the use of lot in the Athenian democracy only in connection with the appointment of magistrates.19 However, given that the magistrates wielded only limited power and that the responsibilities of those magistracies filled by lot were less than those filled by election, such a choice has the effect of downplaying the importance of lot in Athens. Functions much more important than those of the magistrates were also assigned by lot. Members of the Council (boulē) were appointed by lot for a period of one year, and no citizen could be a member of the Council more than twice in his lifetime. The Council comprised 500 members, who were thirty years or older. Each of the 139 districts of Attica (the demes) was entitled to a certain number of seats in the Council (the number was in proportion to the population of the deme). Each deme nominated more candidates than it had seats to fill (it is not clear whether lot was used at this initial stage of the selection process). Lots were then drawn among the candidates for each deme to obtain the requisite number of councilors. On days when the Council sat, its members were paid by the city. Aristotle regarded payment for such political activities as participation in the Assembly, the courts, and the magistracies as one of the essential principles of democracy. In Athens, that principle also applied to the Council.20 Legally, Council membership was a magistracy (archē), and like most magistracies was collegial. However, certain features set it apart. In the first place, only the Council could indict its own members: once indicted, a councilor was tried in the courts, but the Council first had to vote on arraigning him before the courts.21 More important, the boulē constituted the most decisive magistracy (malista kyria), as Aristotle wrote, because it prepared for the agenda for the Assembly and carried out its decisions.22 Whereas the activity of the other magistracies was connected with the courts, the Council was linked directly to the ekklēsia. The Council deliberated about which proposals were to be considered by the Assembly (probouleumata). Some proposals would be formulated in detail; others would be more open, inviting motions from the floor on a particular problem. About half the decrees voted on by the Assembly seem in fact to have been ratifications of precise measures put forward by the Council; the other half stemmed from proposals made directly in the Assembly.23 The Council had further major responsibilities in the field of external affairs. It received all ambassadors and decided whether or not to bring them before the Assembly, first negotiating with them before submitting the results of such talks to the people in the form of a probouleuma. The Council also performed important military functions, being responsible in particular for the navy and for maritime administration. Finally, it had a role of general supervision of public administration, including, very importantly, finance; and in this respect it exercised a degree of control over the other magistrates. Thus the boulē, which was appointed by lot, occupied a central position in the government of Athens. Its role may not have been that of a pilot, but neither was it a subordinate one.
process of self-selection limited the numbers of those taking initiative. But the principle that anyone wishing to do so was equally able to submit a proposal to his fellow-citizens and, more generally, to address them (isēgoria) constituted one of the highest ideals of democracy.17 At any rate, the magistrates had no monopoly of political initiative, and their power was, generally speaking, strictly limited. Evidently, then, as Hansen observes, there is an element of deliberate ignorance or even sophistry in the remarks that Xenophon attributes to Socrates. In ridiculing the practice of selecting magistrates by lot on the grounds that no one would choose a ship's pilot, an architect, or a flute-player by that method, Socrates was deliberately missing the crucial point that, in a democracy, magistrates were not supposed to be pilots.18 That is not the end of the matter, however, because the magistracies, in the strict sense, were not the only offices assigned by lot. Most historical studies choose to discuss the implications of the use of lot in the Athenian democracy only in connection with the appointment of magistrates.19 However, given that the magistrates wielded only limited power and that the responsibilities of those magistracies filled by lot were less than those filled by election, such a choice has the effect of downplaying the importance of lot in Athens. Functions much more important than those of the magistrates were also assigned by lot. Members of the Council (boulē) were appointed by lot for a period of one year, and no citizen could be a member of the Council more than twice in his lifetime. The Council comprised 500 members, who were thirty years or older. Each of the 139 districts of Attica (the demes) was entitled to a certain number of seats in the Council (the number was in proportion to the population of the deme). Each deme nominated more candidates than it had seats to fill (it is not clear whether lot was used at this initial stage of the selection process). Lots were then drawn among the candidates for each deme to obtain the requisite number of councilors. On days when the Council sat, its members were paid by the city. Aristotle regarded payment for such political activities as participation in the Assembly, the courts, and the magistracies as one of the essential principles of democracy. In Athens, that principle also applied to the Council.20 Legally, Council membership was a magistracy (archē), and like most magistracies was collegial. However, certain features set it apart. In the first place, only the Council could indict its own members: once indicted, a councilor was tried in the courts, but the Council first had to vote on arraigning him before the courts.21 More important, the boulē constituted the most decisive magistracy (malista kyria), as Aristotle wrote, because it prepared for the agenda for the Assembly and carried out its decisions.22 Whereas the activity of the other magistracies was connected with the courts, the Council was linked directly to the ekklēsia. The Council deliberated about which proposals were to be considered by the Assembly (probouleumata). Some proposals would be formulated in detail; others would be more open, inviting motions from the floor on a particular problem. About half the decrees voted on by the Assembly seem in fact to have been ratifications of precise measures put forward by the Council; the other half stemmed from proposals made directly in the Assembly.23 The Council had further major responsibilities in the field of external affairs. It received all ambassadors and decided whether or not to bring them before the Assembly, first negotiating with them before submitting the results of such talks to the people in the form of a probouleuma. The Council also performed important military functions, being responsible in particular for the navy and for maritime administration. Finally, it had a role of general supervision of public administration, including, very importantly, finance; and in this respect it exercised a degree of control over the other magistrates. Thus the boulē, which was appointed by lot, occupied a central position in the government of Athens. Its role may not have been that of a pilot, but neither was it a subordinate one.
and above all, it produced an effect similar to that paramount principle of democracy isēgoria – the equal right to speak in the Assembly. The latter gave anyone who so wished an equal share in the power exercised by the assembled people. Lot guaranteed anyone who sought office an equal probability of exercising the functions that were performed by a smaller number of citizens. Even though they could not explain how it was so, democrats had the intuition that elections did not guarantee the same equality.
1 Recently, a few works have helped revive interest in the political use of lot. See in particular Jon Elster, Solomonic Judgements: Studies in the Limitations of Rationality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 78–92. It has also been suggested that a citizen selected at random might elect the candidate of his choice to represent a constituency (see A. Amar, “Choosing representatives by lottery voting,” in Yale Law Journal, Vol. 93, 1984). However, this suggestion gives lot only a limited role: it is used to select a voter, not a representative. 2 Xenophon, Memorabilia, 1, 2, 9. 3I refer to M. H. Hansen, The Athenian Democracy in the Age of Demosthenes (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1991). This is a condensed version, translated into English, of the very much larger work that Hansen originally published in Danish (Det Athenske Demokrati i 4 årh. f. Kr., 6 vols., Copenhagen, 1977–81). Hansen deals primarily with the Athenian institutions of the fourth century BC (from the second restoration of democracy in 403–402 to its final collapse in 322). Indeed, he points out that the sources are very much more plentiful and detailed for this period than for the fifth century, and he stresses that we do not really know much about how the Athenian democracy functioned in the age of Pericles. The institutional histories that focus on the fifth century (on the grounds that it was then that Athens reached the zenith of its power and artistic brilliance), as well as those that deal with the period from the reform of Ephialtes (462) to the final disappearance of democracy (322) as a single entity, are thus obliged to extrapolate on the basis of data that actually relate to the fourth century. Through his choice of period, Hansen avoids such extrapolation, which he regards as unjustified (The Athenian Democracy, pp. 19–23). This does not prevent him, however, from touching on certain features of the institutions of the fifth century. 4On lot and election in Athens, see also, in addition to Hansen’s book: James Wycliffe Headlam, Election by Lot at Athens [1891] (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1933); E.S. Staveley, Greek and Roman Voting (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1972); Moses I. Finley, Democracy Ancient and Modern (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1973), and Politics in the Ancient World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983). 5 These figures do not include the Council (boulē), although it was a board of magistrates. In fact, the powers of the Council were significantly different from those of other magistracies, so it is preferable to consider it separately (see below). 6 The word klēros is a noun, the corresponding verb being klēroun (to draw lots). The fact of obtaining a post by lot is indicated by the verb lanchano, used in the aorist tense and occasionally qualified by a determiner: tō kuatnō lachein (to have been appointed by lot using a bean) or, in an earlier period, palō lachein (to have been appointed by lot drawn from a helmet). 7 Fourth-century Athens had around 30,000 citizens who had reached their majority (i.e. were 20 or over). In the fifth century, the number was probably 60,000 (see Hansen, The Athenian Democracy, pp. 55, 93, 232, 313). These figures do not, of course, include women, children, metics (aliens with some civic privileges), or slaves. There is a tendency today to exaggerate the smallness of Athens. Granted, the city was not large, compared with modern states, but neither was it a village. voting on the magistrates was a compulsory agenda item. Any citizen might then propose a vote of no confidence against a magistrate (whether appointed by lot or by election). If the magistrate lost the vote, he was immediately suspended and his case was referred to the courts, which then had the responsibility of either acquitting him (whereupon he would resume his functions) or condemning him.9 8 Hansen, The Athenian Democracy, pp. 218–20, 239. 9 The Assembly met ten times a year as ekklēsia kyria (once in each prytany, or five-week period), out of a total of forty meetings annually. 10 Hansen, The Athenian Democracy, pp. 97, 230–1, 239. Note that there was even a verb (klērousthai) meaning “to present oneself for selection by lot”; see Aristotle, Constitution of Athens, IV, 3; VII, 4; XXVII, 4. 11 The Theoric Fund was originally set up to distribute payments to citizens enabling them to buy theater tickets for public festivals. In the fourth century, the fund was gradually extended to cover the financing of public works and the navy. 12Hansen, The Athenian Democracy, pp. 39, 268–74. 13Ibid., pp. 228–9. 14 Ibid., pp. 266–7. 15 Aeschines, Against Ctesiphon, III, 220. 16 Hansen, The Athenian Democracy, pp. 143–5. 17 Here the distinction between ideal (one might also say ideology) and practice is only a blunt albeit convenient instrument. The process of self-selection that in practice limited the number of speakers actually received explicit recognition, at least in part, in the ideology of the first comer; ho boulomenos denoted anyone wishing to come forward to make a proposal, not simply anyone. 18 Hansen, The Athenian Democracy, p. 236. 19 Hansen is no exception here: the main discussion of the relationship between lot and democracy occurs in the chapter about magistrates (see Hansen, The Athenian Democracy, pp. 235–7).
1.最近になって、ロットの政治的利用についての関心が復活した作品がいくつかある。特に、Jon Elster, Solomonic Judgements: Studies in the Limitations of Rationality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp.78-92. また、無作為に選ばれた市民が、自分の選んだ候補者を選挙区の代表に選ぶことも提案されている（A. Amar, "Choosing representatives by lottery voting," in Yale Law Journal, Vol.93, 1984参照）。しかし、この提案はlotに限定的な役割しか与えておらず、代表者ではなく有権者を選ぶために使われている。
2 Xenophon, Memorabilia, 1, 2, 9. 3 M. H. Hansen, The Athenian Democracy in the Age of Demosthenes (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1991)を参照。これはハンセンがもともとデンマーク語で出版した非常に大きな著作（Det Athenske Demokrati i 4 årh. f. Kr., 6 vols., Copenhagen, 1977-81）を英訳して凝縮したものである。ハンセンは主に紀元前4世紀のアテネの制度を扱っている（403-402年の第二次民主主義の回復から322年の最終的な崩壊まで）。そして、ペリクレスの時代にアテネの民主主義がどのように機能していたのか、実際にはあまり知られていないことを強調している。5世紀に焦点を当てた制度史（アテネが権力と芸術の頂点に達したのはこの時期であるという理由で）や、エフィアルテスの改革（462年）から民主主義の最終的な消滅（322年）までの期間を一つのまとまりとして扱った制度史は、実際には4世紀に関するデータに基づいて推定せざるを得ないのである。ハンセンはそのような外挿を時代の選択によって避けているが、それは正当化されないと考えている（The Athenian Democracy, pp.19-23）。しかし、そのために5世紀の制度のある特徴に触れることは妨げられない。4アテネにおけるくじと選挙については、ハンセンの著書のほか、次のものも参照。James Wycliffe Headlam, Election by Lot at Athens [1891] (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1933); E.S. Staveley, Greek and Roman Voting (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1972); Moses I. Finley, Democracy Ancient and Modern (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1973), and Politics in the Ancient World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983). 5 この数字には、行政官の集まりである評議会（boulē）は含まれていません。実際、評議会の権限は他の奉行所のそれとは大きく異なっていたので、別個に考えるのが望ましい（後述）。6 klērosは名詞であり、対応する動詞はklēroun（くじを引く）である。これはアオリスト時制で使用され、ときには限定詞で修飾されることもあります。「tō kuatnō lachein（豆を使ったくじ引きで任命された）」や、初期の時代には「palō lachein（兜から引いたくじ引きで任命された）」などです。7 4世紀のアテネには、成人（20歳以上）になった市民が約3万人いた。5世紀には6万人に達していたと思われる（ハンセン『アテネの民主主義』pp.55, 93, 232, 313参照）。もちろん、これらの数字には、女性、子供、メティック（市民としての特権を持つ外国人）、奴隷は含まれていません。今日では、アテネの小ささを誇張する傾向があります。確かに、現代の国家に比べれば都市は大きくはないが、村でもない。市民は誰でも、（くじ引きで任命されたものであれ、選挙で選ばれたものであれ）奉行に対する不信任投票を提案することができたのである。不信任案が否決されると、その奉行は直ちに停職させられ、その案件は裁判所に付託され、裁判所は奉行を無罪にする（奉行は職務を再開する）か、あるいは奉行を有罪にする責任を負うことになる9 8 Hansen, The Athenian Democracy, pp. 9 議会は、年に10回（各プリタニー（5週間）に1回）のエククレシア・キリア（ekklēsia kyria）として開催され、年間40回の会議が行われていた。10 ハンセン『アテネの民主主義』97頁、230-1頁、239頁。なお、アリストテレス『アテネの憲法』IV, 3; VII, 4; XXVII, 4を参照して、「くじ引きで選ばれるために自分を差し出す」という意味の動詞（klērousthai）も存在した。 11 Theoric Fundは、もともと市民が公共の祭りのための劇場チケットを購入できるように分配するために設立された。4世紀になって、その楽し
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In governance, sortition (also known as selection by lottery, selection by lot, allotment, demarchy, stochocracy, aleatoric democracy and lottocracy) is the selection of political officials as a random sample from a larger pool of candidates.[1] Sortition is generally used for filling individual posts or, more usually in its modern applications, to fill collegiate chambers.[citation needed] The system intends to ensure that all competent and interested parties have an equal chance of holding public office. It also minimizes factionalism, since there would be no point making promises to win over key constituencies if one was to be chosen by lot, while elections, by contrast, foster it.[2] In ancient Athenian democracy, sortition was the traditional and primary method for appointing political officials, and its use was regarded as a principal characteristic of democracy.[3]
Athenian democracy developed in the 6th century BC out of what was then called isonomia (equality of law and political rights). Sortition was then the principal way of achieving this fairness. It was utilized to pick most[5] of the magistrates for their governing committees, and for their juries (typically of 501 men). Aristotle relates equality and democracy:
Democracy arose from the idea that those who are equal in any respect are equal absolutely. All are alike free, therefore they claim that all are free absolutely... The next is when the democrats, on the grounds that they are all equal, claim equal participation in everything.[6]
It is accepted as democratic when public offices are allocated by lot; and as oligarchic when they are filled by election.[7]
In Athens, "democracy" (literally meaning rule by the people) was in opposition to those supporting a system of oligarchy (rule by a few). Athenian democracy was characterised by being run by the "many" (the ordinary people) who were allotted to the committees which ran government. Thucydides has Pericles make this point in his Funeral Oration: "It is administered by the many instead of the few; that is why it is called a democracy."[8]
The Athenians believed sortition to be democratic but not elections[5] and used complex procedures with purpose-built allotment machines (kleroteria) to avoid the corrupt practices used by oligarchs to buy their way into office. According to the author Mogens Herman Hansen the citizen's court was superior to the assembly because the allotted members swore an oath which ordinary citizens in the assembly did not and therefore the court could annul the decisions of the assembly. Both Aristotle[5] and Herodotus (one of the earliest writers on democracy) emphasize selection by lot as a test of democracy, "The rule of the people has the fairest name of all, equality (isonomia), and does none of the things that a monarch does. The lot determines offices, power is held accountable, and deliberation is conducted in public."[9]
Past scholarship maintained that sortition had roots in the use of chance to divine the will of the gods, but this view is no longer common among scholars.[10] In Ancient Greek mythology, Zeus, Poseidon, and Hades used sortition to determine who ruled over which domain. Zeus got the sky, Poseidon the sea, and Hades the underworld.
In Athens, to be eligible to be chosen by lot, citizens self-selected themselves into the available pool, then lotteries in the kleroteria machines. The magistracies assigned by lot generally had terms of service of 1 year. A citizen could not hold any particular magistracy more than once in his lifetime, but could hold other magistracies. All male citizens over 30 years of age, who were not disenfranchised by atimia, were eligible. Those selected through lot underwent examination called dokimasia in order to avoid incompetent officials. Rarely were selected citizens discarded.[11]Magistrates, once in place, were subjected to constant monitoring by the Assembly. Magistrates appointed by lot had to render account of their time in office upon their leave, called euthynai. However, any citizen could request the suspension of a magistrate with due reason.[12]
Lombardy and Venice – 12th to 18th century
The brevia was used in the city states of Lombardy during the 12th and 13th centuries and in Venice until the late 18th century.[13] Men, who were chosen randomly, swore an oath that they were not acting under bribes, and then they elected members of the council. Voter and candidate eligibility probably included property owners, councilors, guild members, and perhaps, at times, artisans. The Doge of Venice was determined through a complex process of nomination, voting and sortition.
Lot was used in the Venetian system only in order to select members of the committees that served to nominate candidates for the Great Council. A combination of election and lot was used in this multi-stage process. Lot was not used alone to select magistrates, unlike in Florence and Athens. The use of lot to select nominators made it more difficult for political sects to exert power, and discouraged campaigning.[11] By reducing intrigue and power moves within the Great Council, lot maintained cohesiveness among the Venetian nobility, contributing to the stability of this republic. Top magistracies generally still remained in the control of elite families.[14]
Florence – 14th and 15th century
Scrutiny was used in Florence for over a century starting in 1328.[13]Nominations and voting together created a pool of candidates from different sectors of the city. The names of these men were deposited into a sack, and a lottery draw determined who would get be a magistrate. The scrutiny was gradually opened up to minor guilds, reaching the greatest level of Renaissance citizen participation in 1378–1382.
In Florence, lot was used to select magistrates and members of the Signoria during republican periods. Florence utilized a combination of lot and scrutiny by the people, set forth by the ordinances of 1328.[11] In 1494, Florence founded a Great Council in the model of Venice. The nominatori were thereafter chosen by lot from among the members of the Great Council, indicating a decline in aristocratic power.[15]
Switzerland
Because financial gain could be achieved through the position of mayor, some parts of Switzerland used random selection during the years between 1640 and 1837 to prevent corruption.[16]
India
Local government in parts of Tamil Nadu such as the village of Uttiramerurtraditionally used a system known as kuda-olai where the names of candidates for the village committee were written on palm leaves and put into a pot and pulled out by a child.[17]
Methods
Before the random selection can be done, the pool of candidates must be defined. Systems vary as to whether they allot from eligible volunteers, from those screened by education, experience, or a passing grade on a test, or screened by election by those selected by a previous round of random selection, or from the membership or population at large. A multi-stage process in which random selection is alternated with other screening methods can be used, as in the Venetian system.
One robust, general, public method of allotment in use since 1997 is documented in RFC 3797: Publicly Verifiable Nominations Committee Random Selection. Using it, multiple specific sources of random numbers (e.g., lotteries) are selected in advance, and an algorithm is defined for selecting the winners based on those random numbers. When the random numbers become available, anyone can calculate the winners.
David Chaum, a pioneer in computer science and cryptography, proposed Random-Sample Elections in 2012. Via recent advances in computer science, it is now possible to select a random sample of eligible voters in a verifiably valid manner and empower them to study and make a decision on a matter of public policy. This can be done in a highly transparent manner which allows anyone to verify the integrity of the election, while optionally preserving the anonymity of the voters. A related approach has been pioneered by James Fishkin, director of the Center for Deliberative Democracy at Stanford, to make legally binding decisions in Greece, China and other countries.[18][19]
In Ancient Greece, a Kleroterion was used to select eligible and willing citizens to serve jury duty. This bolstered the initial Athenian system of democracy by getting new and different jury members from each tribe to avoid corruption.[20]
Sortition is most commonly used to form citizens' assemblies. As an example, Vancouver council initiated a citizens' assembly that met in 2014–15 in order to assist in city planning.[21]
Sortition is commonly used in selecting juries in Anglo-Saxon legal systems and in small groups (e.g., picking a school class monitor by drawing straws). In public decision-making, individuals are often determined by allotment if other forms of selection such as election fail to achieve a result. Examples include certain hung elections and certain votes in the UK Parliament. Some contemporary thinkers[who?] have advocated a greater use of selection by lot in today's political systems, for example reform of the British House of Lords and proposals at the time of the adoption of the current Constitution of Iraq.
Sortition is also used in military conscription, as one method of awarding US green cards, and in placing students into some schools.[22]
Democratic governance of non-governmental organizations
Sortition also has potential for helping large associations to govern themselves democratically without the use of elections. Co-ops, employee owned businesses, housing associations, Internet platforms, student governments, and countless other large membership organizations whose members generally don't know many other members yet seek to run their organization democratically often find that elections are problematic. The essential leadership decisions are made by the nomination process, often generating a self-perpetuating board whose nominating committee selects their own successors. Randomly selecting a representative sample of members to constitute a nominating panel is one procedure that has been proposed to keep fundamental control in the hands of ordinary members and avoid internal board corruption.[23]
Examples
Law court juries are formed through sortition in some countries, such as the United States and United Kingdom.
Citizens' assemblies have been used to provide input to policy makers. In 2004, a randomly selected group of citizens in British Columbia convened to propose a new electoral system. This Citizens' Assembly on Electoral Reform was repeated three years later in Ontario'scitizens' assembly. However, neither assembly's recommendations reached the required thresholds for implementation in subsequent referendums.
MASS LBP, a Canadian company inspired by the work of the Citizens' Assemblies on Electoral Reform, has pioneered the use of Citizens' Reference Panels for addressing a range of policy issues for public sector clients. The Reference Panels use civic lotteries, a modern form of sortition, to randomly select citizen-representatives from the general public.
Democracy In Practice, an international organization dedicated to democratic innovation, experimentation and capacity-building, has implemented sortition in schools in Bolivia, replacing student government elections with lotteries.[24]
DanishConsensus conferences give ordinary citizens a chance to make their voices heard in debates on public policy. The selection of citizens is not perfectly random, but still aims to be representative.
Private organizations can also use sortition. For example, the Samaritan Ministries health plan sometimes uses a panel of 13 randomly selected members to resolve disputes, which sometimes leads to policy changes.[25]
The Amish use sortition applied to a slate of nominees when they select their community leaders. In their process, formal members of the community each register a single private nomination, and candidates with a minimum threshold of nominations then stand for the random selection that follows.[26]
Citizens' Initiative Review at Healthy Democracy uses a sortition based panel of citizen voters to review and comment on ballot initiative measures in the United States. The selection process utilizes random and stratified sampling techniques to create a representative 24-person panel which deliberates in order to evaluate the measure in question.[27]
The environmental group Extinction Rebellion has as one of its goals the introduction of a Citizens' assembly that is given legislative power to make decisions about climate and ecological justice.[1]
In 2015 the city of Utrecht randomly invited 10,000 residents, of whom 900 responded and 165 were eventually chosen, to participate in developing its 2016 energy and climate plan.[29][30]
In 2019, the German speaking Ostbelgien province in Belgium, implemented the Ostbelgien Model, consisting of an 24 member Citizen’s Council which convenes short term Citizen’s Assemblies to provide non binding recommendations to its parliament.[31] Later that same year both the main and French only Brussels Region parliaments voted to authorize setting up mixed parliamentary committees composed of parliamentarians and randomly selected citizens to draft recommendations on a given issue.[32]
In 2013 the New Zealand Health Research council began awarding funding at random to applicants considered equally qualified.[33]
Political proposals for sortition
As part of reworking the state
John Burnheim, in his book Is Democracy Possible?, describes a political system in which many small "citizen's juries" would deliberate and make decisions about public policies. His proposal includes the dissolution of the state and of bureaucracies. The term demarchy he uses was coined by Friedrich Hayek for a different proposal,[34]unrelated to sortition, and is now sometimes used to refer to any political system in which sortition plays a central role.[35]
Influenced by Burnheim, Marxist economists Allin Cottrell and Paul Cockshott propose that, to avoid formation of a new social elite in a post-capitalist society, "[t]he various organs of public authority would be controlled by citizens' committees chosen by lot" or partially chosen by lot.[36]
L. León coined the word lottocracy for a sortition procedure that is somewhat different from Burnheim's demarchy.[37] While "Burnheim ... insists that the random selection be made only from volunteers",[38]León states "that first of all, the job must not be liked".[39]Christopher Frey uses the German term Lottokratie and recommends testing lottocracy in town councils. Lottocracy, according to Frey, will improve the direct involvement of each citizen and minimize the systematical errors caused by political parties in Europe.[40]
Anarcho-capitalist writer Terry Hulsey detailed a 28th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution to randomize the election of congressmen and senators, and indirectly, the President of the United States. The key to its success, in his opinion, is that the critical selection of the initial pool of candidates is left strictly to the states, to avoid litigation regarding "fairness" or perfect randomness.[41]
C. L. R. James's 1956 essay "Every Cook Can Govern" suggested to select, through sortition, a large legislative body (such as the U.S. Congress) from among the adult population at large.[42]
Ernest Callenbach and Michael Phillips push for random selection of the U.S. House of Representatives in their book A Citizen Legislature(1985). They argue this scheme would ensure fair representation for the people and their interests, an elimination of many realpolitikbehaviors, and a reduction in the influence of money and associated corruption, all leading to better legislation.[43]
Étienne Chouard, a French political activist, proposes replacing elections with sortition.[44][45]
Terry Bouricius, a former Vermont legislator and political scientist, proposes in a 2013 journal article how a democracy could function better without elections, through the use of many randomly selected bodies, each with a defined role.[46]
In 2015, Graham Kirby proposed using sortition to reform the UKHouse of Lords in Disclaimer magazine.[47]
In his 2017 presidential election platform, French politician Jean-Luc Mélenchon of La France Insoumise lays out a proposal for a sixth republic.[48] The upper house of this republic would be formed through national sortition. Additionally, the constituent assembly to create this republic would have 50% of its members chosen in this way, with the remainder being elected.[49]
To choose legislative juries
Simon Threlkeld, in the 1998 journal article "A Blueprint for Democratic Law-Making: Give Citizen Juries the Final Say"[50] and later articles, proposes that laws be decided by legislative juries rather than by elected politicians or referenda.[51] The existing legislatures would continue to exist and could propose laws to legislative juries, but would no longer be able to pass laws. Citizens, public interest groups and others would also be able to propose laws to legislative juries.
To decide the franchise
Simon Threlkeld, in the 1997 journal article "Democratizing Public Institutions: Juries for the selection of public officials"[52] and later articles, proposes that a wide range of public officials be chosen by randomly sampled juries, rather than by politicians or popular election.[51] As with "convened-sample suffrage", public officials are chosen by a random sample of the public from a relevant geographical area, such as a state governor being chosen by a random sample of citizens from that state.
Political scientist Robert A. Dahl suggests in his book Democracy and its critics (p. 340) that an advanced democratic state could form groups which he calls minipopuli. Each group would consist "of perhaps a thousand citizens randomly selected out of the entire demos", and would either set an agenda of issues or deal with a particular major issue. It would "hold hearings, commission research, and engage in debate and discussion". Dahl suggests having the minipopuli as supplementing, rather than replacing, legislative bodies.
The House of Commons in both Canada[54] and the United Kingdom[55] could employ randomly selected legislators.
The ratio of legislators decided by election to those decided by the lottery is tied directly to the voter turnout percentage. Every absentee voter is choosing sortition, so, for example, with 60% voter turnout a number of legislators are randomly chosen to make up 40% of the overall parliament. Each election is simultaneously a referendum on electoral and lottery representation.[56]
Political science scholars Christoph Houman Ellersgaard, Anton Grau Larsen and Andreas Møller Mulvad of the Copenhagen Business School suggest supplementing the Danish parliament, the Folketing, with another chamber consisting of 300 randomly selected Danish citizens to combat elitism and career politicians, in their book Tæm Eliten (Tame the Elite).[57]
To replace an appointed upper house
The upper house of a parliament might be selected through sortition. Anthony Barnett, Peter Carty and Anthony Tuffin proposed this to the Royal Commission on the Reform of the House of Lords in the UK in 1999.[58]
Advantages
Representation of the population
A modern advocate of sortition, political scientist John Burnheim, argues for systems of sortition as follows:
Let the convention for deciding what is our common will be that we will accept the decision of a group of people who are well informed about the question, well-motivated to find as good a solution as possible and representative of our range of interests simply because they are statistically representative of us as a group. If this group is then responsible for carrying out what it decides, the problem of control of the execution process largely vanishes.[59]
This advantage does not equally apply to the use of juries.
Cognitive diversity
Cognitive diversity is an amalgamation of different ways of seeing the world and interpreting events within it,[60] where a diversity of perspectives and heuristics guide individuals to create different solutions to the same problems.[61] Cognitive diversity is not the same as gender, ethnicity, value-set or age diversity, although they are often positively correlated. According to numerous scholars such as Page and Landemore,[62] cognitive diversity is more important to creating successful ideas than the average ability level of a group. This "diversity trumps ability theorem"[63] is essential to why sortition is a viable democratic option.[61] Simply put, random selection of persons of average intelligence performs better than a collection of the best individual problem solvers.[61]
Fairness
Sortition is inherently egalitarian in that it ensures all citizens have an equal chance of entering office irrespective of any bias in society:[64]
Compared to a voting system – even one that is open to all citizens – a citizen-wide lottery scheme for public office lowers the threshold to office. This is because ordinary citizens do not have to compete against more powerful or influential adversaries in order to take office, and because the selection procedure does not favour those who have pre-existing advantages or connections – as invariably happens with election by preference.[65]
Random selection has the ability to overcome the various demographic biases in race, religion, sex, etc. apparent in most legislative assemblies. Greater perceived fairness can be added by using stratified sampling. For example, the Citizens' Assembly on Electoral Reform in British Columbia sampled one woman and one man from each electoral district and also ensured representation for First Nations members. Bias may still exist if particular groups are purposefully excluded from the lottery such as happened in Ancient Athens where women, slaves, younger men and foreigners were not eligible.
Democratic
Greek writers who mention democracy (including Aristotle,[5]Plato and Herodotus) emphasise the role of selection by lot or state outright that being allotted is more democratic than elections. For example, Plato says:
Democracy arises after the poor are victorious over their adversaries, some of whom they kill and others of whom they exile, then they share out equally with the rest of the population political offices and burdens; and in this regime public offices are usually allocated by lot.[66]
Sortition may be less corruptible than voting. Author James Wycliffe Headlam explains that the Athenian Council (500 administrators randomly selected), would commit occasional mistakes such as levying taxes that were too high. Additionally, from time to time, some in the Council would improperly make small quantities of money from their civic positions. However, "systematic oppression and organized fraud were impossible".[68] These Greeks recognized that sortition broke up factions, diluted power, and gave positions to such a large number of disparate people that they would all keep an eye on each other making collusion fairly rare. Furthermore, power did not necessarily go to those who wanted it and had schemed for it. The Athenians used an intricate machine, a kleroterion, to allot officers. Headlam also explains that "the Athenians felt no distrust of the lot, but regarded it as the most natural and the simplest way of appointment".[69]
Like Athenian democrats, critics of electoral politics in the 21st-century argue that the process of election by vote is subject to manipulation by money and other powerful forces and because legislative elections give power to a few powerful groups they are believed to be less democratic system than selection by lot from among the population.
Empowering ordinary people
An inherent problem with electoral politics is the over-representation of politically active groups in society who tend to be those who join political parties. For example, in 2000 less than 2%[70] of the UK population belonged to a political party, while in 2005 there were at best only 3 independent MPs (see List of UK minor party and independent MPs elected) so that 99.5% of all UK MPs belonged to a political party. As a result, political members of the UK population were represented by one MP per 1800 of those belonging to a party whilst those who did not belong to a party had one MP per 19 million individuals who did not belong to a party.[verification needed]
Additionally, participants grow in competence by contributing to deliberation. Citizens are more significantly empowered by being a part of decision-making that concerns them. Most societies have some type of citizenship education, but sortition-based committees allow ordinary people to develop their own democratic capacities through participation.[71]
Loyalty is to conscience not to political party
Elected representatives typically rely on political parties in order to gain and retain office. This means they often feel a primary loyalty to the party and will vote contrary to conscience to support a party position. Representatives appointed by sortition do not owe anything to anyone for their position.
Statistical properties
The representativeness and statistical properties of institutions like councils (committees), magistrates (cabinets) and juries selected by lot were mathematically examined by Andranik Tangian, who confirmed the validity of this method of appointment.[72][73]
Disadvantages
Incompetence
The most common argument against pure sortition (that is, with no prior selection of an eligible group) is that it takes no account of skills or experience that might be needed to effectively discharge the particular offices to be filled. Were such a position to require a specific skill set, sortition could not necessarily guarantee the selection of a person whose skills matched the requirements of being in office unless the group from which the allotment is drawn were itself composed entirely of sufficiently specialized persons. This is why sortition was not used to select military commanders (strategos) in ancient Athens.[73]
By contrast, systems of election or appointment ideally limit this problem by encouraging the matching of skilled individuals to jobs they are suited to. Submitting their qualifications to scrutiny beforehand, either by the electorate or other persons in positions of authority, ensures that those manifestly unqualified to hold a given position can be prevented from being elected or appointed to discharge it.[citation needed]
[Socrates] taught his companions to despise the established laws by insisting on the folly of appointing public officials by lot, when none would choose a pilot or builder or flautist by lot, nor any other craftsman for work in which mistakes are far less disastrous than mistakes in statecraft.[74]
The same argument is made by Edmund Burke in his essay Reflections on the Revolution in France (1790):
There is no qualification for government but virtue and wisdom, actual or presumptive. [...] Everything ought to be open, but not indifferently, to every man. No rotation; no appointment by lot; no mode of election operating in the spirit of sortition or rotation can be generally good in a government conversant in extensive objects. Because they have no tendency, direct or indirect, to select the man with a view to the duty or to accommodate the one to the other.[75]
Misrepresentation
In case demographic stratification is not rigorously put in place, there is always the statistical possibility that sortition may put into power an individual or group that do not represent the views of the population from which they were drawn. This argument is mentioned by Isocrates in his essay Areopagiticus (section 23):
[It was] considered that this way of appointing magistrates [i.e., elections] was also more democratic than the casting of lots, since under the plan of election by lot chance would decide the issue and the partizans of oligarchy would often get the offices; whereas under the plan of selecting the worthiest men, the people would have in their hands the power to choose those who were most attached to the existing constitution.[76]
This argument applies to juries, but less to larger groups where the probability of, for example, an oppressive majority, are statistically insignificant. The modern processes of jury selection and the rights to object to and exclude particular jurors by both the plaintiff and defence are used to potentially lessen the possibilities of a jury not being representative of the community or being prejudicial towards one side or the other. Today, therefore, even juries in most jurisdictions are not ultimately chosen through pure sortition.
Illegitimacy
Those who see voting as expressing the "consent of the governed" maintain that voting is able to confer legitimacy in the selection. According to this view, elected officials can act with greater authority than when randomly selected.[77] With no popular mandate to draw on, randomly selected politicians lose a moral basis on which to base their authority and are open to charges of illegitimacy.[77]
Moreover, the logistical constraints of sortition and deliberation encourage governing bodies to be kept small, limiting participation.[citation needed]Since it is statistically unlikely that a given individual will participate in the deliberative body, sortition creates two groups of people, the few randomly chosen politicians and the masses. Identifying the source of sortition's legitimacy has proven difficult. As a result, advocates of sortition have suggested limiting the use cases of sortition to serving as consultative or political agenda-setting bodies.[78]
Enthusiasm
In an elected system, the representatives are to a degree self-selecting for their enthusiasm for the job. Under a system of pure, universal sortition the individuals are not chosen for their enthusiasm.[11] Many electoral systems assign to those chosen a role as representing their constituents; a complex job with a significant workload. Elected representatives choose to accept any additional workload; voters can also choose those representatives most willing to accept the burden involved in being a representative. Individuals chosen at random from a comprehensive pool of citizens have no particular enthusiasm for their role and therefore may not make good advocates for a constituency.[46]
Unaccountability
Unlike elections, where members of the elected body may stand for re-election, sortition does not offer a mechanism by which the population expresses satisfaction or dissatisfaction with individual members of the allotted body. Thus, under sortition there is no formal feedback, or accountability, mechanism for the performance of officials, other than the law.[11]
B., Kraybill, Donald (2013). The Amish. Johnson-Weiner, Karen., Nolt, Steven M., 1968–. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. ISBN9781421409146. OCLC810329297.
Christopher Frey (16 June 2009). Lottokratie: Entwurf einer postdemokratischen Gesellschaft. Geschichte der Zukunft, volume 4. Books on Demand. ISBN978-3-83-910540-5
Barnett, Anthony; Carty, Peter (2008). The Athenian Option: Radical Reform for the House of Lords (2nd ed.). Imprint Academic.
Burnheim, John (2006). Is Democracy Possible?. University of California Press. pp. 124–5. ISBN978-1920898427.
Landemore, Helene (2012). "Deliberation, Cognitive Diversity, and Democratic Inclusiveness: An Epistemic Argument for the Random Selection of Representatives". Synthese. 190 (7): 1209–1231. doi:10.1007/s11229-012-0062-6. S2CID21572876.
^ abcPage (2007). How the power of diversity creates better groups, firms, schools, and societies. Princeton University Press.
Zaphir, Luke (2017). "Democratic communities of inquiry: Creating opportunities to develop citizenship". Educational Philosophy and Theory. 50 (4): 359–368. doi:10.1080/00131857.2017.1364156. S2CID149151121.
Tangian, Andranik (2008). "A mathematical model of Athenian democracy". Social Choice and Welfare. 31 (4): 537–572. doi:10.1007/s00355-008-0295-y. S2CID7112590.
^ abTangian, Andranik (2020). "Chapter 1 Athenian democracy″ and ″Chapter 6 Direct democracy". Analytical theory of democracy. Vols. 1 and 2. Studies in Choice and Welfare. Cham, Switzerland: Springer. pp. 3–43, 263–315. doi:10.1007/978-3-030-39691-6. ISBN978-3-030-39690-9.
Lafont, Cristina (March 1, 2015). "Deliberation, Participation, and Democratic Legitimacy: Should Deliberative Mini-publics Shape Public Policy?". Journal of Political Philosophy. 23 (1): 40–63. doi:10.1111/jopp.12031. ISSN1467-9760.
External links
Equality by lot — news, discussions and general information about sortition
“A Shadow on Meritocracy” is a documentary film about the ongoing research springing from the Ig Nobel Prize-winning work of Alessandro Pluchino and Andrea Rapisarda, physicists at the University of Catania. The film is in Italian; this version has English subtitles:
That research is documented in the study “The Peter Principle Revisited: A Computational Study,”” Alessandro Pluchino, Andrea Rapisarda, and Cesare Garofalo, Physica A, vol. 389, no. 3, February 2010, pp. 467-72.
We will all celebrate the new book in a special show at the University of Catania, on Thursday, April 6. The show features: Marc Abrahams and Ig Nobel Prize winners Marina de Tommaso (measuring the relative pain people suffer while looking at an ugly painting, rather than a pretty painting, while being shot [in the hand] by a powerful laser beam), Elizabeth Oberzaucher (mathematical analysis of the man who fathered 888 children), and of course Cesare Garofalo, Alessandro Pluchino, and Andrea Rapisarda (organizations would become more efficient if they promoted people at random).
ピーター・プリンシプルがどのように作用するかを分析し、その結果としてイグ・ノーベル賞を受賞したイタリアの研究者たちが、その経験をまとめた新しい本を出版しました。アレッサンドロ・プルキーノ、アンドレア・ラピサルダ、チェーザレ・ガロファロの3人が執筆した『Abiamo vinto l'Ig Nobel con il principio di Peter』（Malcor D'刊）という本です。
参考 What did democracy really mean in Athens? - Melissa Schwartzberg https://youtu.be/0fivQUlC7-8
The Principles of Representative Government Bernard Manin (著) 1997(原著仏語1994)
参考動画 What did democracy really mean in Athens? - Melissa Schwartzberg 参考書籍 The Principles of Representative Government Bernard Manin (著) 1997(原著仏語1994)
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What did democracy really mean in Athens? - Melissa Schwartzberg
https://youtu.be/0fivQUlC7-8
The Principles of Representative Government
Bernard Manin (著)
1997(原著仏語1994)
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What did democracy really mean in Athens? - Melissa Schwartzberg
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The Principles of Representative Government
Bernard Manin (著) 1997(原著仏語1994)
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What did democracy really mean in Athens? - Melissa Schwartzberg
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